From: lippard@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) Newsgroups: sci.skeptic Subject: Re: Plagiarism in Spring 94 issue of Skeptical Inquirer?? Date: 15 Apr 1994 16:37 MST Organization: University of Arizona Lines: 99 Distribution: world Message-ID: <15APR199416370606@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> References: <3364.2dadb477@mbcl.rutgers.edu> In article <3364.2dadb477@mbcl.rutgers.edu>, hey@mbcl.rutgers.edu writes... >A funny thing happened in the Spring 94 issue of Skeptical Inquirer. > >On page 289 in an article by William Grey on "Philosophy and the Paranormal" >appears the following sentence: > > That is Hume addresses the epistemological issue of what is > rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of > what is and is not possible in our sort of world. > >On page 298, in a book review, Robert A Baker write: > > In essense, Hume is addressing the epistemological issue of what is > rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of > what is and is not possible in our sort of world. > >But for the first few words, the sentences are identical. A total of 26 words, >including at least one quite unlikely phrase "... in our sort of world." >The sentences are not in quotes, and it is difficult to avoid thinking that >one of the author's "copied" the other, or that both "copied" a third source. >Both authors are refering to Hume's "Of Miracles". > >Any ideas or opinions on what is going on? It appears that Prof. Grey rewrote his _New Zealand Skeptic_ article (which is actually cited and quoted by Baker) for the _Skeptical Inquirer_, and that Prof. Baker used portions of the former article without proper attribution in his book review. There is significantly more plagiarism than previously noted: [1] William Grey, "Philosophy and the Paranormal: Part 2: Skepticism, Miracles, and Knowledge," _Skeptical Inquirer_ vol. 18, no. 3, Spring 1994, pp. 288-294. [2] Robert A. Baker, "Nary A Miracle In Sight," _Skeptical Inquirer_ vol. 18, no. 3, Spring 1994, pp. 298-300. [1], p. 289: "Hume was _not_ claiming to show that miracles have never occurred. Proving negative existence claims is notoriously problematic. Hume's claim was the importantly different one that we are never rationally justified in believing that miracles have occurred. That is, Hume addresses the epistemological issue of what it is rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of what is and is not possible in our world. "The argument has two parts. First, Hume argues that the evidence _against_ miracles is usually very strong." [2], p. 298: "In the latter part of the eighteenth century the Scottish philosopher David Hume asked himself the question, Are we ever justified in believing that miracles have in fact occurred? Hume's answer was no. He did not, however, claim to show that miracles _have never occurred_, since proving negative existence claims is notoriously problematic. Hume's claim is the importantly different one that we are never rationally justified in believing that miracles have occurred. In essence, Hume is addressing the epistemological issue of what is rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of what is and is not possible in our world. Recognizing that Hume's argument that the evidence _against_ miracles is usually very strong, the multi- talented Joe Nickell nevertheless believes that we should never 'put the cart before the horse by deciding, antecedent to inquiry, whether or not miracles exist.'" [1], pp. 289-290 (skipping only one parenthetical sentence after the above quotation): "We have therefore to weigh the evidence that a miraculous event happened against the evidence that it did _not_ happen. [One sentence and quote from Hume deleted. -jjl] "The second stage of the argument claims that even though the evidence in favor of miracles _might_ outweigh the evidence against them, _in practice this never happens_. [Two sentences deleted. -jjl] "First there is the problem of witness credibility. [Three sentences deleted. -jjl] All claims for miracles, that is, suffer from what we call a credibility gap. "The second problem that Hume identifies is human credulity. There is a natural human affinity for the novel, the surprising, and the marvelous." [2], p. 300: "In his summary of his lengthy search for a simple, ordinary, run-of- the-mill miracle, Nickell figuratively shakes his head and concludes that he is forced to agree with David Hume: the evidence against miracles is very strong. If we weigh the evidence that a miraculous event happened against the evidence that it did not, we invariably find that the latter evidence outweighs the former. Moreover, even though evidence in favor of miracles _might_ outweigh the evidence against them, _in practice this never happens_. Hume also tells us that all claims for miracles suffer from a credibility gap, and we must face the problem of human credulity--the natural human affinity for the marvelous and our inclination toward superstition. According to the philosopher William Grey in his excellent essay 'Skepticism and Miracles' (_New Zealand Skeptic_, June 1993, No. 28, pp. 1-6): [quotation deleted; it appears in [1], p. 290]" Jim Lippard Lippard@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU Dept. of Philosophy Lippard@ARIZVMS.BITNET University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721 From: lippard@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) Newsgroups: sci.skeptic Subject: Re: Plagiarism in Spring 94 issue of Skeptical Inquirer?? Date: 16 Apr 1994 19:29 MST Organization: University of Arizona Lines: 42 Distribution: world Message-ID: <16APR199419290572@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> References: <3364.2dadb477@mbcl.rutgers.edu> <15APR199416370606@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu> In article <15APR199416370606@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu>, lippard@skyblu.ccit.arizona.edu (James J. Lippard) writes... :In article <3364.2dadb477@mbcl.rutgers.edu>, hey@mbcl.rutgers.edu writes... :>A funny thing happened in the Spring 94 issue of Skeptical Inquirer. :> :>On page 289 in an article by William Grey on "Philosophy and the Paranormal" :>appears the following sentence: :> :> That is Hume addresses the epistemological issue of what is :> rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of :> what is and is not possible in our sort of world. :> :>On page 298, in a book review, Robert A Baker write: :> :> In essense, Hume is addressing the epistemological issue of what is :> rational to believe, rather than the metaphysical question of :> what is and is not possible in our sort of world. :> :>But for the first few words, the sentences are identical. A total of 26 words, :>including at least one quite unlikely phrase "... in our sort of world." :>The sentences are not in quotes, and it is difficult to avoid thinking that :>one of the author's "copied" the other, or that both "copied" a third source. :>Both authors are refering to Hume's "Of Miracles". :> :>Any ideas or opinions on what is going on? : :It appears that Prof. Grey rewrote his _New Zealand Skeptic_ article (which :is actually cited and quoted by Baker) for the _Skeptical Inquirer_, and :that Prof. Baker used portions of the former article without proper :attribution in his book review. [more specifics deleted] I contacted _Skeptical Inquirer_ editor Kendrick Frazier about this. He says that what happened is that when Baker shortened his review at Frazier's request, Baker accidentally deleted an introductory paragraph which explained that much of what he had to say about Hume in his review was based on Grey's _New Zealand Skeptic_ article. Baker has written a letter of apology to Prof. Grey. Jim Lippard Lippard@CCIT.ARIZONA.EDU Dept. of Philosophy Lippard@ARIZVMS.BITNET University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721